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In the previous issue of the SAJBL, McQuoid-Mason discussed the 
recent Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children, and Resources Aimed at the 
Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN) v. Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development case,[1] in the article ‘Decriminalisation of 
consensual sexual conduct between children: What should doctors do 
regarding the reporting of sexual offences under the Sexual Offences 
Act until the Constitutional Court confirms the judgement of the 
Teddy Bear Clinic case?’.[2] He submits that, following the judgement, 
doctors are no longer obliged to report consensual underage sex. We 
respectfully disagree. Our article critiques his approach and proposes 
an alternative interpretation of the judgement. Finally, it suggests a 
more nuanced reporting approach for doctors and researchers in the 
post-Teddy Bear era.
In the last few years many doctors and researchers have faced a 
complex dilemma regarding the mandatory reporting of consensual 
underage sex.[3] On the one hand, the Children’s Act[4] provides that 
children from the age of 12 are entitled, without parental consent, 
to access a range of sexual and reproductive health services such as 
contraceptives, HIV testing and treatment for sexually transmitted 
infections.[5] However, until recently, the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (the 
‘Sexual Offences Act’)[6] provided that sex under the age of 16, even if 
consensual, was a criminal offence.[6]
Section 54(1) of the Act also provided that any person ‘who has 
knowledge that a sexual offence has been committed against a child’ 
must report this ‘immediately’ to the police.[6] Accordingly, this placed 
an obligation on all service providers, including doctors, nurses and 
health researchers, to report consensual underage sex or sexual 
activity.[3] This broad reporting obligation meant, for example, that 
any healthcare provider assisting an adolescent (under the age of 16) 
with a termination of pregnancy would be obligated to report that a 
sexual offence had occured (i.e. consensual sexual penetration) even 
though this could have the unintended consequence of undermining 
the adolescent’s rights in terms of the Choice of Termination of 
Pregnancy Act.[7]
Given that many researchers and healthcare providers could, 
intentionally or by inference, become aware of a child’s sexual activity 
(because they lawfully asked adolescents questions about their sexual 
activity, identified sexually transmitted diseases, or provided HIV 
testing, pregnancy services or access to contraceptives) they had 
to decide how to respond to underage sex or sexual activity and its 
accompanying mandatory reporting requirements. They could either 
provide children with confidential sexual and reproductive health 
services, thus complying with the Children’s Act but ignoring the 
Sexual Offences Act, or they could comply with the criminal law and 
report to such behavior to the police, thus breaching the doctor/
patient relationship and adversely affecting the researcher/participant 
relationship, as well as undermining a child’s sexual and reproductive 
rights according to legislation such as the Children’s Act.[3]
These provisions, and their implications for both health researchers 
and providers, have led to considerable debate. For example, McQuoid-
Mason[8] argues that the duty to report sexually active adolescents is 
unconstitutional, as it encroaches on the best interests of the child 
and limits the child’s constitutional right to privacy. Based on similar 
arguments, other authors proposed ways of mitigating this overly 
broad mandatory reporting requirement. Strode and Slack[3] suggest 
that only ‘exploitative’ underage consensual sex should be reported, 
while Bhana et al.[9] suggest that in such situations researchers should 
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work with a non-governmental organisation (NGO), such as Childline, 
that could act as an intermediary in the reporting process. 
Against this backdrop, the outcome of the recent Teddy Bear Clinic is 
significant, as it addressed whether consensual underage sex ought to 
be criminal offence and thus reported. 
McQuoid-Mason’s recommended 
approach
McQuoid-Mason refers to his earlier work, in which he argued that, 
although doctors were under a legal duty to report underage sex, 
this duty ‘may be unconstitutional if it violates the constitutional 
“best interests of the child” principle, and unreasonably and 
unjustifiably limits the constitutional rights of children to bodily and 
psychological integrity and privacy.’[8] Furthermore, he had earlier 
argued that this duty undermined the purpose of other sexual 
and reproductive rights granted by the Children’s and Choice of 
Termination of Pregnancy Acts.[7] 
He submits that although the Teddy Bear case declared Sections 
15 and 16 of the Sexual Offences Act (which criminalise underage 
consensual sex and sexual activity) to be unconstitutional, it left open 
the issue of the mandatory reporting of underage consensual sexual 
intercourse.[2] Nevertheless, he submits that as underage sex has been 
decriminalised, the duty to report such conduct falls away as children 
are no longer committing a sexual offence.[2] 
Accordingly, McQuoid-Mason states that the only remaining 
reporting obligation is to report sexual abuse in accordance with the 
Children’s Act.[2] 
McQuoid-Mason concludes that although the Constitutional Court 
has yet to confirm this decision, doctors would be justified in not 
reporting consensual underage sex because (i) the High Court has 
judged the criminalisation of such conduct unconstitutional (and this 
is likely to be upheld by the Constitutional Court); and (ii) because 
there is no duty to report consensual sexual activities involving 
children if doing so would violate the constitutional ‘best interests of 
the child’ principle.[1] 
Critique of the McQuoid-Mason approach
It is submitted that McQuoid-Mason’s argument fails to recognise the 
nuances of the approach taken by Justice Rabie in the Teddy Bear case. 
Firstly, it does not recognise that even post the Teddy Bear case, there 
are certain forms of consensual sexual activity with children that remain 
illegal. These include sex between an adult (a person over 18) and an 
adolescent (aged 12 - 15). In a society with high levels of intergenerational 
sex,[10] it is possible that many healthcare workers or researchers would 
become aware that a sexual offence is being committed against a child 
if they ask them questions about their sexual partner. Likewise, not all 
forms of peer sex are legal. If a child aged 12 - 15 has sex with an older 
partner aged 16 - 17 there may not be more than a 2-year age gap 
between them or the older person will still be committing a criminal 
offence. Accordingly, again, reporting will be required. 
Secondly, Justice Rabie specifically found that there is no need 
to address the constitutionality of Section 54(1)(a) of the Sexual 
Offences Act dealing with the mandatory reporting of sexual 
offences against children, as he had already found that Sections 
15 and 16 were inconsistent with the Constitution (paragraph 
121).[1] This means that these sections will remain in place for the 
foreseeable future. 
An alternative approach 
We submit that there are a number of mandatory reporting 
implications for healthcare providers and researchers working with 
adolescents following the Teddy Bear case. 
Firstly, the case has eased some of the reporting burdens, and 
researchers and healthcare providers are no longer automatically 
required to report underage sex. In the past, if an adolescent 
aged 12 - 15 declared that they were sexually active or indicated 
such through their actions, for example, if they tested positive for 
herpes, the mandatory reporting requirements were triggered. 
Following the Teddy Bear case this is no longer the situation, as 
only the older partner (either the person over 18 or the older 
adolescent of 16 - 17) is an offender. Therefore, there is not always 
an obligation to report, as the researcher or healthcare worker 
may not have ‘knowledge’ of the person who committed the 
sexual offence with the 12 - 15-year-old.
Secondly, the decision facilitates access to sexual and reproductive 
health services for 12 - 15-year-olds. Consensual sex where both 
parties are aged 12 - 15 is now no longer a sexual offence and 
the adolescent cannot be charged. This takes away the reporting 
dilemma that healthcare providers and researchers faced in the past, 
where they had to elect to either comply with the criminal law or 
the Children’s Act. This was a key problem with the provisions in the 
Sexual Offences Act, as pointed out by McQuoid-Mason.[2,8] 
Thirdly, we submit that the judgment is narrow in its scope. As 
a result, researchers and healthcare providers must be aware that 
certain forms of consensual, underage sex or sexual activity with 12 - 
15 year olds will still have to be reported if one of the participants is: 
• Over the age of 18
• Aged 16 - 17, with more than a 2-year age gap between the 
participant and their younger sexual partner
• Under the age of 12.
Resultantly, the judgment raises many reporting complexities: Firstly, 
many adolescents (12 - 17) may disclose that they are sexually involved 
with persons 18 years and older. Secondly, younger adolescents (12 - 15) 
may reveal sexual involvement with adolescent partners who are older by 
more than 2 years, for example, a 13-year-old with a 16-year-old. Thirdly, 
older adolescents (16 - 17) may inform healthcare workers that they are 
sexually involved with children who are younger by more than 2 years. 
If researchers or doctors report sex or sexual activity in this 
context, it may well have the same harmful consequences that 
were identified in the Teddy Bear case. For example, adolescents, 
particularly girls, will be dragged into the criminal justice system 
as they will have to give evidence against their older partner, who 
faces a criminal record and being entered onto the sexual offenders 
register. This may inadvertently place adolescents at risk of negative 
consequences, such as domestic violence, and will undermine the 
trust within both therapeutic and research relationships. 
Therefore, even these more relaxed provisions provide ethical 
challenges: both researchers and healthcare providers are still under a 
legal duty to report consensual underage sex in certain circumstances 
and they have not been accorded any discretion in this regard. This 
is particularly problematic in settings where intergenerational sex or 
sex between partners of different ages is a social reality. Accordingly, 
we assert that even after the Teddy Bear case, a more nuanced 
approach may be required.
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Conclusion
Addressing underage consensual sex is a key public health issue. The 
Teddy Bear case is significant as the court recognised that adolescents 
aged 12 - 15 have a right to engage in ‘healthy sexual behaviour’ 
(paragraph 107).[1] Thus, for the first time, a court recognised that the 
disparate approaches to adolescent sexuality in the Sexual Offences 
Act and Children’s Act were not in the best interests of children. It is 
argued that this is the first step towards developing a more coherent 
approach to adolescent sexuality which has both public health and 
human rights benefits. 
However, doctors and researchers are still left with a reporting 
dilemma where the child is under the age of 12; or where a 12 - 
15-year-old is having consensual sex with a much older partner; 
where a 16 - 17-year-old is having consensual sex with a partner more 
than 2 years younger; or where the child is having sex with a person 
over 18. Further debate is required on this issue, and must consider 
either (i) law reform to limit the nature of the mandatory reporting 
obligations, or alter them to give service providers some discretion in 
determining when reporting a consensual sexual offence would be 
in the best interests of the child (aged 12 - 15); Or (ii) a constitutional 
challenge attacking the excessive broadness of these mandatory 
reporting obligations. 
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McQuoid-Mason responds: I have no problem with most of this article, as it confirms what I have written. I also have no issue with most of the 
‘critique’, save as to say, as I mentioned in my original paper, that as the Constitutional Court still has to confirm the invalidation of certain provisions 
of the Sexual Offences Act, and they are therefore still in place. In the meantime, health practitioners should be guided by the Constitutional ‘best 
interests of the child’ principle, when deciding whether or not to report an offence involving children under the Act. 
This does not mean that they must never report such offences – if it is ‘in the best interests of the child’, they must comply with the law and report 
them. Guidelines for what is ‘in the best interests of the child’ are spelled out in some detail in the Children’s Act[1] and my earlier article[2] referred 
to by the authors. While it is a pity that the authors do not explain what a ‘more nuanced approach’ may be, I have no issue with their conclusions 
about the need for guidelines for reporting, and perhaps a Constitutional challenge regarding the reporting obligations. My article was intended to 
give some interim guidance to health professionals who are daily confronted by the dilemmas described above, and my suggestion is that we rely 
on the ‘best interests of the child’ provisions in the Children ‘s Act and the Constitution to guide our actions.
Meanwhile, on 3 October 2013, the Constitutional Court ruled in the follow-up Teddy Bear Clinic appeal case (The Teddy Bear Clinic for 
Abused Children and RAPCAN and others v. Minister of Justice and National Director of Public Prosecutions). [3] The Court held that:
• Sections 15 and 16 of the Sexual Offences Act were invalid to the extent that they impose criminal liability for sexual offences on children 
under 16 years of age 
• the declaration of invalidity is suspended for a period of 18 months from the date of the judgment, to allow Parliament to correct the 
defects
• from the date of the judgment there is a moratorium on all investigations into, arrests of, prosecutions of, and criminal and ancillary 
proceedings regarding such Section 15 and 16 offences – including the duty to report such consensual sexual conduct between children 
under 16 years of age under Section 54 of the Act (Teddy Bear Clinic case para. 111) – pending Parliament’s correction of the Act 
• any convictions or diversion orders made as a result of such offences committed by children under 16 years of age in terms of Sections 
15 and 16 of the Act shall be expunged from the National Register for Sex Offenders.
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